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1. From “Moderate” Pillar to “Radical” Post
Is the term, “moderate Islam,” an oxymoron? Is it only a way of 
congratulating or encouraging Muslims for being like us – for sharing liberal 
humanist egalitarian values? Is the term, “moderate Islam,” then, any more 
an oxymoron than “radical Islam” is a tautology – that is to say, a formula for
condemning Muslims who are not like us – whose values we find 
disagreeable? Cautiously circling around that dilemma are the contributors 
to Richard L. Benkin’s edited volume, What Is Moderate Islam? But such 
assiduous avoidance of unacknowledged fundamental definitional questions 
rarely wins admiration. As a result, the book consists of a series of chapters 
that bounce readers back and forth between discussions of “pillars” of good, 
“moderate” Islam, on the one hand, to the “posts” of bad, “radical” Islam, on
2the other. Not a word is written to dispel the view that key terms of the 
collection -- “moderate” and “radical” -- are loaded from the get-go. Maybe a
volume admitting as much would fail to satisfy readers of its conceptual 
decisions. But not even admitting the problem is unforgivable.
The result? Not much here is new. About bad, “radical” Islam, what don’t we 
already know? What sort of Western reader will defend the laundry lists of 
assaults on the fundamentals of liberal humane values represented in so-
called belligerence, authoritarianism, violence, intolerance, misogyny, and 
prudery? Benkin and company spend far too much time kicking in open 
doors when we most need to be knocking on the barricaded doors of honest 
entry. How to  maneuver around Benkin’s question-begging discourse of 
“moderate” and “radical” will present the main problems for this review. By 
contrast, the second book paired for review -- Richard Paul Churchill’s 
Women in the Crossfire – shows us an author brave enough innovatively to 
hammer away at precisely such a grim and forbidding subject – honor killing 
– without naively assuming the virtue of our own values and the vice of the 
values of others. But does his enlightened project succeed in more ways than
Benkin’s benighted one?
Having said this, Benkin’s volume offers a good deal of valuable information, 
however conceptually compromised. For instance, Umar Duad Khattak’s 
“Moderate Islam Is an Illusion – at Least for Now” devotes over a page 
painstakingly itemizing 18 or so “radical” Muslim beliefs and practices, 
guaranteed to repel any non-jihadi reader. Whether this be the 
determination to convert all non-Muslims, believing that only Muslims will 
live a blessed afterlife, wallowing in a sense of paranoid victimhood, even 
while feeling flush with power, and so on, the mind of a “radical” Muslim 
seems fevered in sickness  (147-8). Similarly, Kulbhushan Warikoo’s “Islamist
Extremism: Threat to World Peace and Security” leads a Cooke’s Tour of 
nation by nation horrors of “radical” Islam. You want atrocities against 
women, children or ethnic-religious minorities? (28). Then, Afghanistan is just
the place for you. Are textbooks for efficient Islamization, your thing, or 
3madrassas fitted out for mass brain-washing young minds more to your 
taste? Then, by all means, plan to stop-over in Pakistan  (31). Or, if 
widespread, garden-variety human rights abuse better suits your tastes, the 
whole of Central Asia is ready for you to roam  (43). Liberals who spout 
vacuities like “Islam is a religion of peace” need to be reminded that Islam’s 
being a religion doesn’t inoculate it from evil-doing any more than our 
Crusader ancestors were certified virtuous because they were emissaries for 
the Vicar of Christ. 
And, whether headed abroad or staying at home, Daniel Pipes’ list of 90 odd 
questions listed in his “Smoking out Islamists via Extreme Vetting” may yield
unexpected results (15-20). Wondering whether that suspicious swarthy 
neighbor in the next apartment is on the up-and-up? Simply ask what he 
thinks of “polytheists,” or whether his woman has the right to dress anyway 
she likes, say, exposing her hair, bared arms and legs, or if religion and the 
state should be separate, or whether he’d let his kid go on an overnight trip 
with their school class, or should his wife have equal rights in initiating a 
divorce, or what about “homosexuality,” or, whether women should work 
outside the home and even occupy “high governmental office,” and so on?  
Pipes is dead sure that by using his handy list of questions, one will be able 
to “smoke out” whether that guy next door is an Islamist or, maybe… the 
local Chabadnick rebbe. 
These unanticipated results from the extreme vetting Pipes aims solely at 
Muslims should caution us about singling out Islam as “radical,” even in 
Benkin’s sense of the term. More is at stake, at least since judging what is 
“radical” depends on how “radical” is defined and one’s point of view. By 
that standard, other religions and ideological systems may be equally 
“radical” as Islam. So, maybe it is time we stepped back a pace and 
recognized the entire enterprise of “smoking out” people who are not like us 
– “radicals” -- and celebrating those who are like us – “moderates” -- for 
what it is: arguably an exercise in identifying who our fellow tribe members 
are or are not. It may not, however, tell us anything worth knowing about 
4Islam. I submit that if we want to do justice to the issues prompted by 
Benkin’s book, we need to penetrate candidly to the heart of our 
assumptions about what it means to be “moderate” or “radical” in 
interesting ways. If being “moderate,” only means being like us, and being 
“radical” means not being like us, such an effort is unlikely to produce 
revelations. Benkin’s book fails being “interesting” because it can largely be 
dismissed as an uncritical exercise in cultural tribalism.
2. A Real Issue: Muslim Monism versus Muslim Diversity
Despite how tiresome Benkin’s way of addressing the “moderate”/”radical” 
issues can be, we do learn more about the under-told story of monistic  
Islam.  Whether these monistic trends are “moderate” or “radical” is 
irrelevant. What is important are the respectively homogenizing Saudi and 
Iranian campaigns now being promoted across the Muslim world. The 
insurgent efforts of ISIS and Al-Qaeda to bring all (mostly Sunni) Muslims 
under the caliphate’s black flag also may be counted alongside analogous 
Saudi and Iranian state endeavors. The opposition of monistic/diverse Islam 
may then matter more, and be less ideologically loaded, than Benkin’s 
obsession with the so-called “moderate”/“radical” binarism. 
Benkin’s collection contains at least two instructive chapters on monistic 
“radical” threats to the Islam of Pakistani Balochistan. These serve to 
celebrate real examples of  Benkin’s “moderate” Islam amid the bevy of 
chapters (discussed above) about “radical” Islam’s deplorables. Chapter 5, 
Meerain Baloch’s “An Islam That Rejects Islamists: The Case of Baloch” may 
be the first exposure for many readers of an Islam palatable to a secular 
Western worldview. State and religion are separate, as are social and 
personal domains. Balochs value minorities and seek to protect them from 
predation by the mighty  (98f). A Baloch code of hospitality and their values 
of trust, loyalty to one’s word make for a welcoming environment  (101). 
5Somehow or other, and remarkably, the Baloch have devised social schemes 
to short-circuit revenge violence, as well  (100f). What puts Islam on the spot
is the fact that for the Balochs, Islam does not exhaust the entirety of what it
means to be a Baloch. Nor, however Muslim the Balochs, on the whole, may 
be, Islam does not need to be acknowledged by non-Muslims as the principal,
and certainly not established, religion of the Balochs. All this is worth 
knowing, but also needs to be kept at least analytically separate from the 
“moderate”/”radical” question. 
Also, worth knowing is that the Balochs may survive the Islamic monisms 
being rolled out from Riyadh or Teheran, respectively, but that reputedly 
“moderate” Muslim states such as Malaysia and Bangladesh seem to be 
falling gradually under their respective sway. The title of Benkin’s chapter, 
“The Myth of Bangladesh as a Moderate Muslim Nation,” speaks for itself. 
With a population half the size of the United States’ squeezed onto territory 
the size of the state of Iowa, and a slowly encroaching Indian Ocean 
devouring its fragile coastal land, it is no wonder that Bangladeshi jihadis 
have become a major export. A more complex, but likewise depressing story 
is told by Sunil Kukreja’s, “Whither Moderate Islam: Malaysian Style.” There, 
a gradual and relentless Wahhabi drive to shape Malaysian Islam according 
to its own image seems to be winning the day (88). Despite an ebb and flow 
between deliberate policies to establish a moderate Islam over against 
counter-currents of Wahhabism, (65-6), a one-size-fits-all “exclusive brand of
Islam” seems to be slowly squeezing out other diverse indigenous forms of 
Islam (69). Greatly complicating matters have been the government’s 
policies for deepening national integration, employing an ideology of 
Malaysian “moderate” Islam, on the one side, and a popular wave of pious 
sentiment for greater Islamization cresting, as it were, at the same time, on 
the other. “Which way, Malays?” one is tempted to ask. Like so many other 
examples in the Muslim world, Islam seems uneasily stumbling towards 
different kinds of futures – some of which secular humanists will find 
6palatable, others they will not. Against the polemic thrust of Benkin’s 
volume, I would argue that it is a mistake to mire ourselves in the confusions
of moderate versus radical Islam. Instead, those seeking to understand the 
major macro-trends in the Muslim world should focus more on understanding
the reasons, causes and consequences of monistic efforts to unify what had 
previously been diverse forms of Islam. What accounts for these efforts? 
What should the reaction of the West be to them? 
3. The Dromedary in the Room
Amidst all the many useful facts and trends Benkin’s people amass, they 
ignore the hulking dromedary in the room – a “dromedary” of a conceptual 
or definitional question. These  demands knowing if the contributors of this 
volume understand the term, “moderate Islam,” to be as much an oxymoron 
as “radical Islam” is a tautology? “Moderate” or “radical” are terms heavily 
laden with – unacknowledged -- assumptions and value-judgments. Dare 
they confess whose convenience is being served by assuming untroubled 
applications of such terms like “moderate” and “radical” with respect to 
Islam? Looking that dromedary straight in the eye, I would ask whether 
Benkin and his contributing authors really mean that radicalization is simply 
Islam come into its own – simply Islam taking off the gloves? Similarly, do 
they really mean that “moderate” Islam is a way-station on the road to full 
secularization? Further, do Benkin and company possibly believe there is 
some neutral way to make the case that so-called “radical” Islam constitutes 
an illegitimate development of Islam? What do Benkin and his collaborators 
finally really believe about so-called “religious” value systems? Are these 
bound to be incompatible with any liberal democratic order? And, if so, what 
reasons do Benkin and company have for seeming to assume that Islamic 
values are any less compatible with a secular, liberal democratic order than 
say the Jewish values of large segments of the Israeli political order, or the 
Christian Democratic values of Bavaria or Italy, or the aggressive Christian 
7nationalist political values in the US? This is to say that Benkin and company 
need to do a lot of explaining about their view of the compatibility of 
“religious” values across the board with a secular democratic political order.
4. Self-Owning, Other-Owning: Either or Both?
Perhaps the biggest victim of Benkin’s failure to acknowledge the dromedary
in the room is our understanding of the opportunities that Islam may offer for
understanding ourselves. Pipes, for instance, implicitly indicts Islam as 
“radical” for restricting marriage of its women to non-Muslim men, for 
requiring religious tax from non-Muslims living in Muslim lands or forbidding 
other religions freedom to proselytize among Muslims. But looked at in other 
ways, such an indictment of bad, radical Islam may prove to be superficial at 
best. Anthropologist Talal Asad raises some critical questions about our own 
values by comparing them with the different vision of human nature Islam 
represents. In this penetrating discussion of religious notions such as 
blasphemy and secular critique, Asad calls attention to the Occidental pre-
eminence of the ideal of the “self-owning” individual. He does so explicitly by
contrasting it comparatively with Islam’s notion of self as belonging to 
another. In an analogous way, anthropologist Louis Dumont has also puzzled 
over Islam’s sharing with the West the ideal of equality, but without affirming
individualism. Asad argues that at a fundamental level, religion is not best 
conceived as Christian do -- as “belief.” Rather, Muslims view “What matters,
finally, is belonging to a peculiar way of life in which the person does not own
himself.” (Asad 2013:39) For Muslims, the self, then, is conceived as 
belonging to to Allah ultimately, and proximately to the ummah, and to Islam
as a collectivity. 
Conceiving the human person as “belonging to another” generates an 
entirely different morality from one dominated by the self-owning person. In 
8that context of other-ownership, for instance, a most grievous moral offense 
would be to alienate the Muslim from their living relationships, to disrupt the 
networks of belonging that make whole the Muslim self. This is why 
“seduction,” (or even perhaps with “persuasion” or proselytizing). becomes a
serious matter for Muslims. This may help explain Muslim opposition to the 
marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men, or Muslim sensitivity to 
proselytizing by non-Muslims in Muslim lands. Both would constitute 
attempts to weaken the community and the network of relations sustaining 
it. “Beliefs,” strictly speaking, have little or nothing to do with these rules. It 
is the act of “seduction” that matters.
Muslims conceive “seduction” as leading someone away from where they 
belong, from their living relationships. Our sexual sense of seduction may be 
part of this, not because of the sex, but because of the social alienation. And,
the social alienation matters because it is felt to threaten the sense of a 
person’s deepest self. Seduction amounts to something far worse for the 
Muslim than taking possession of the body of another. In seducing someone, 
the Muslim sees the very elemental loyalties and affections of another 
subjected to the will of another.(Asad 2013:25)  “To seduce,” in the sense 
salient for Muslims, says Asad, “is to incite someone to open up his or her 
innermost self to images, sounds and words offered by the seducer and to 
lead the seduced – complicit or unwitting – to an end first conceived by the 
former.” (Asad 2013:26) Seduction facilitates the ultimate act of personal 
derangement.
5. How the Muslim “Other” Helps Us Understand Ourselves
I would submit that Asad’s observations are powerful because they avoid the
trite claims that the Muslims have it right (or wrong) and the West has it 
wrong (or right) about “ownership” of the self. Rather, in bringing out the 
9conception of a self as belonging to a larger whole, Asad challenges us, “self-
owning” Occidentals, to consider the vulnerabilities of our own preferred 
view of human nature. Inevitably, the comparison raises the prospects of 
there being unacknowledged strengths in a Muslim view of human being. 
Of course, once we think about it for a while, we may recognize that the 
notion of self as belonging to others is not necessarily utterly alien to the 
West. For example, is each partner in a marriage self-owning – at least as 
equally self-owning as before being married? It is only the peculiar historical 
development of Western societies that has pushed the notion of a self as 
belonging to another into the shadows as the image of the free-willed, inner-
directed, self-reliant, autonomous individual ascends into the light. In this 
way, Western civilization’s ominous decision to opt for the ideal of self-
owning individualism becomes salient by pertinent comparison with Islam. It 
pushes us to question the strengths and vulnerabilities of self-owning. The 
Muslim critique of “seduction” might, for instance, give Westerners pause to 
ponder what we have lost in forsaking the ideal of belonging to another? 
What social costs have even self-owning individuals incurred by being 
seduced in one way or another? Consider the damage done to the integrity 
of the human person and our duties to others by, say, our constant, 
everyday bombardment by seductive mass media advertising. Far from 
trivial, on the Muslim view, the assault of advertising by its “hidden 
persuaders” constitutes a moral danger to human freedom and dignity. 
Stealthily, mass media advertising steals the soul and its affections, frames 
our relationships in potentially unhealthy ways, captures the knowing mind 
and its attitudes, however much we may have become inured to it as just the
price of doing business. This then is only one example of how aspects of 
what Benkin and company call “radical” Islam might actually be read 
otherwise as offering a way for Westerners to gain critical purchase on 
values usually gone unexamined.
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6. Robert Paul Churchill’s Manual for Moral Revolution 
Since the book being paired with Benkin’s treats honor killing -- Robert Paul 
Churchill’s extraordinary Women in the Crossfire: Understanding and Ending 
Honor killing -- readers might begin to wonder about the longer polemic arc 
of my argument. It may be all very well and good, some readers might think, 
that some “radical” Islamic values can alert Western victims to the dangers 
lying in wait for them, say from the “hidden persuaders” of commercial or 
political seduction. But just how does an Asad, or the present reviewer, 
propose to interpret “radical” Islam’s practice of honor killing (HK, hereafter) 
analogously? I can see how interpreting aspects of “radical” Islam can help 
me see how commercial or political interests try to commandeer my buying 
or voting mind by their seductive methods, and how that can derange my 
relations with those with whom and to whom I may belong. But surely 
nothing analogous can be said to accrue to our benefit from a moderate look 
at honor killing? After all, “Extremism in the pursuit of virtue is no vice,” as 
Senator Barry Goldwater said years ago, “And moderation in the pursuit of 
justice is no virtue.” Barry Goldwater obviously cannot speak for Asad, but I 
cannot imagine any conditions under which readers would entertain 
moderation in the interrogation of honor killing.
That may be the main reason I cannot think of another book that has moved 
me to such sadness as Churchill’s. Without even putting faces on its victims, 
Churchill forces readers to come to terms with the anguish and desperation 
of its women victims. They die lonely, wretched, demeaning deaths by the 
thousands each year. A powerful witness to their plight, Churchill’s 
achievement is great, especially considering subject matter that tries the 
human spirit. In all honesty, nothing that Churchill could – or should -- have 
done could change this. The fact that honor killing has ever existed, and 
indeed continues to exist (at the rate of 20,000 per year) cannot but sicken 
us to mourn our hapless far-flung sisters. Yet, grief is only part of the story. 
Not content to wallow in the glum facts of HK, Churchill’s initial chapters 
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parade an exhaustive array of ways to understand the occurrence and 
persistence of HK, while the final chapters lay out an uplifting practical 
strategy for ending it. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of Churchill’s writing this 
book is “moral revolution” -- to bring on a radical transformation that will 
effectively end HK. That motive drives the book forward from first page to 
last. 
7. No Honor Killing without Honor, And a Fact-List
Conceptual rigor and clarity are conspicuous strengths of Churchill’s book. So
too is the exhaustive description of all aspects of HK that Churchill provides 
readers. Over the course of twelve pages, Churchill delivers a detailed 
portrayal of every imaginable aspect of what honor killing involves from the 
characteristics of victims or perpetrators to the characteristics of the 
communities enabling this social practice (58-70). Beneath the blizzard of 
details a substratum of “honor” keeps every detail in place. HKs are a 
particular species of killing, always bound up with issues of honor. Not only 
that, HK carries on today, both persistent and resilient  (11).  As such HKs 
are “social practices” that are “both dependent on and help to structure the 
larger sociocultural life of” honor/shame cultures  (hereafter HSC) (72). 
That’s quite a mouthful. But what it means is that HK does not stand alone, 
but rather is meaningful only in terms of the rules governing so-called HSCs. 
That embeddedness in a network of cultural and social understandings 
explains for Churchill why HK cannot simply be outlawed or otherwise 
extracted for the purpose of its elimination. Put otherwise, this is to say that 
honor itself is a function of “how society regards one, not a matter of 
individual integrity.” Being “honored” is all about what people think they 
know, about perception. Honor is a measure of one’s worth in the eyes of 
others, (78) and a matter of one’s social “survival” (81). 
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Now, as many problems as an HSC throws up, Churchill does not want to 
abolish honor/shame behavior, nor to replace HSCS with our guilt/sin moral 
culture. The Alevis of Turkey and the Tuaregs of North Africa abide by the 
rules of HSCs, but do not practice HK (271-6). Churchill’s proposal to end the 
practice of HK pays respect to the antiquity and logical integrity of the honor/
shame system, but seeks instead to encourage its reform from within, by 
relying on a society’s own notions of a greater or better sense of honor. Like 
many of us chastened by the failures of social intervention, Churchill feels 
that even well-intentioned tampering with the inner workings of another 
culture not only bespeaks hubris, but also may also court disaster for the 
society invaded. It is far easier to crash an alien moral system than to supply
a viable replacement. For Churchill, this means that those wanting to change
societies need to retain as much of the original as possible. One, therefore, 
ends HK, not by upsetting the HSC tout court, but by revising its rules of 
honor. Honor itself is enlisted to reframe situations (269). Somehow or other 
– and Churchill is as unclear about this as is an honor theorist like Kwame 
Anthony Appiah – HK abolitionists must convince members of HSCs that HK is
not honorable.(Appiah 2010) “Cognitive dissonance” should be induced by 
framing HK as a shameful act for a “real man” to perform, however wayward 
the woman. Even though it seems to beg the question, occasionally Churchill
argues that reformers might argue that HK should be replaced with a greater
and better sense of honor because HK is “outdated” (264) and “archaic” 
(266). 
Opposed to honor stands shame. To lose honor, to be shamed, is to be 
diminished, the inverse of pride (82). Unlike guilt, shame cannot be relieved, 
say, by  a device like “confession,” atonement or forgiveness (83). Shame is 
socio-cultural filth. To be shamed is to be socially polluted. As such, the only 
solution to loss of honor is “washing,” being cleansed of pollution (83). Such 
“washing,” therefore, requires some overt action. The only way honor can be
restored, polluting shame washed away, is by an act by or sanctioned by the 
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community to effect such a restoration. HK is one of the way the pollution of 
female transgression is purged, or washed away, leaving the family 
implicated in the transgression scrubbed clean of shame.
So thoroughly embedded are the rules of honor/shame in the societies 
dominated by them that even in an HK, all participants – the victim as well -- 
recognize “honor” as the basis for HK. HKs are fully deliberate and often 
performed in public. Focused as they are on the honor of families, HSCs 
require that an intimate male family member, who is deeply engaged in 
issues of family honor, to do the deed. A brother, uncle, cousin, or father 
thus does the deed  (18). Indeed, doing HK is one of the deeds men 
consciously believe they must accept doing openly to prove to the 
community that they are “real men,” responsible family members in charge 
of their women  (27).  HK is, therefore, not performed by a potential sexual 
partner of the victim, but by someone otherwise a protector.  
Nor should HKs be confused with garden-variety gender violence or “IPV” – 
“intimate partner violence” (15). An HK is an “execution.” They are neither 
political killings, such as assassinations, nor spontaneous crimes of passion  
(16-7). Unlike other cases of IPV or other honor-oriented violence (HOV), the 
death of the victim is the intended outcome of the assault, not some lesser 
act, such as enslavement or exile  (16). To us, HKs may seem 
disproportionate to the offense committed. This raises the question why, in 
HSCs, is death, with all its finality and irreversibility, the just penalty for 
committing a possibly passing sexual transgression? Why not exile, 
enslavement or some other lesser penalty? Moreover, why is even the 
“perception” of an offense by the woman in question sufficient to require 
HK’s performance  (10)? The answers to such questions always seem to 
come down to a realization of what one is tempted to call the “brittleness” 
(144) or fragility of HSCs, with their fixed gender roles, strict in-group/out-
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group designations, living in relatively harsh and unforgiving physical 
environments, and so on. Societies on the edge, so to speak, however long-
lived, simply have slimmer margins for error. A woman dishonoring her 
family threatens to bring down the family. For the sake of the survival of the 
family, she and the shame she has brought must be purged. 
8. The Micro-Causes of HK: Violence Prone Warriors and the Honor of the 
Female Body
While these make up an impressive list of necessary conditions for HK, their 
sufficiency remains in considerable doubt. HSCs, such as the Alevis of Turkey
and the Tuaregs of North Africa seem to survive quite well without practicing 
HK. For the sufficient conditions for HK, we must therefore look elsewhere. 
That is why Churchill moves quickly to identify potential underlying 
psychological and sociological structures in chapters 4-6 sufficient to explain 
HK. Churchill attacks this problem from two complementary strategic 
vantagepoints. From the “micro-“ level, then, what psychological causal 
structures select for HK (chapters 4 and 5)? And, from the “macro-“ level, as 
well, what socio-cultural causes come into play to produce the social practice
of HK (chapter 6)? 
In chapters 4 and 5, Churchill spells out what he believes is the intricate 
complex of psychological beliefs about manliness and femininity that inform 
a culture of HK. Notably, Churchill devotes what seems to this reviewer as an
inordinate amount of attention to child-rearing practices. His concern to 
identify the causes of the personality type likely to perpetrate HK follows an 
at least (lower-case) freudian path. Practices like playfully fondling the 
genitals of pre-pubescent boys by their amused nurse maids, aunts and 
grandmothers draws Churchill’s attention (109-110). Or, his focus instead 
passes to the way circumcision becomes rite of passage to manhood (122-6).
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But all this is in pursuit of the ways that HSCs manufacture – Judith-Butler-
like – a particular kind of masculine psyche  (102 ). Churchill fittingly 
describes this process in dire terms. “Parenting and socialization,” concludes 
Churchill, “for some male children can be so unpredictable brutal and 
traumatic as to result in traumatic bonding with their aggressors” (130) No 
wonder these youths turn into men who can murder a female relative with 
impunity.
Churchill further argues that since killing is elemental in HK, everything 
begins with the question of identifying the causes of the “violence prone 
personality” (VPP). The likely suspects prone to violence in societies where 
HK exists are always males. Yet, the targets of male violence vary with 
gender. In war, for instance, violence occurs between men. Why then do the 
VPP men kill women, as in HK? Well, the mere fact that HK occurs – by 
definition -- in so-called Honor Shame Cultures (HSC) does not solve the 
problem. Churchill believes something about strong male/female opposition 
in HSCs plays a role here  (101). Since binarism divides men and women into
different, incompatible roles, this would account for why men only do HK to 
women. Men do not kill other men in HKs, nor women other women in HKs 
they might initiate. Binarism against dictates that how women behave, or are
perceived to behave, is seen as the responsibility of men to enforce. While 
women may be the reservoirs or receptacles of the family’s honor, but it is 
the manly men who are responsible for avenging, protecting, enforcing, etc. 
the honor of the family.  In HSCs male/female binarism features ways in 
which it can be determined who the “real men” are. Consistent with 
binarism, HSCs feature a highly ramified notion of masculinity. Salient among
such polar notions of masculinity is what Churchill calls “warrior-masculinity”
(WM)  (103). Now, in situations where VPP and WM coincide, the ideal of 
warrior masculinity merges with personalities that are “violence prone.” And,
when the issue of defending honor is added to the mix, we have a potent 
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combination that Churchill argues provides further “necessary conditions” of 
the expectation of an “actual” killing (104).
But what of the opposite pole of the binary? Where then do the ways women 
are conceived come in? How is it that they become victims of killings, and 
not their male co-transgressors? Where do they figure in calculations of 
“honor”? In a nutshell, it is in the body of women that the reservoir of the 
honor of the family resides (138). Individual women, one recalls from our 
earlier discussion, are not self-owning but belong to others – in this case to 
the family. Violations of her body -- even suspicions of violation – pollute the 
entire family. Violations of the woman thus bring devastating shame and 
dishonor on the entire family. Further, we also know that women are 
believed to be sexually powerful, by nature. Thus, if something sexually 
deviant or abusive (rape, infatuation, sexual arousal and so on) should occur,
she is always presumed to be at fault (168). Women are also believed to be 
natural temptresses, so powerful that men are relatively powerless in their 
presence. Thus, when a woman is accused of sexual misconduct, it is she, 
rather than her male partner, who bears the blame, who loses honor. But 
dishonor does not end there with the individual woman. Since she is the 
reservoir of honor, from which the family drinks, so to speak, her shame and 
dishonor pollute the entire family as well. HK is the act by which the family 
blots out their shame and dishonor.
Therefore, unless the family reclaims its honor, and dispels any shame, it will
not survive. It will have lost all standing in the community. In cases of 
dishonor, the family turn to its leaders -- its warrior defenders, those charged
with being the family’s “Ardent Avengers” of shame and dishonor. The 
family, typically through the agency of these warrior masculine men, 
assumes its role in blotting out the shame caused by a wayward wife. It falls 
to those chosen by the family to “redress grievances” befalling the family, 
such as the case of one of their women bringing shame on the family. This 
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sets the stage for the VPP and WM to act against the woman who has 
shamed the family. HK is the means by which these grievances are resolved.
9. Macro-Development Is Micro-Destiny
In Chapter 6, Churchill tries to account for the way gross cultural 
determinants create conditions favorable for the rise and maintenance of HK.
Churchill’s cultural materialist story says that unlike the psychological and 
emotional – “micro” (181) -- perspectives informing Chapters 4 and 5, the 
explanations of HK in Chapter 6 are delivered from on high – from the 
“macro” level (181) of millennia of cultural social evolution. HK supposedly 
evolved as a slowly emerging social practice formed by the survival needs 
favored by particular social structures in which it occurred. HK is thus a 
“unique form of gender violence” (10) that “emerged over a long course of 
time,” (221) only under certain specific cultural conditions. It is something 
that “must have” (215) passed through a longue durée of discernable stages
of “natural selection” on its way to becoming what it is today. 
Churchill, accordingly, argues from tenets of “natural selection” (184) 
peculiar to “cultural evolution” theory. These tenets include the limiting 
conditions set by their kinship organization, the physical ecology in which a 
human group finds itself, the mode of production employed to cope with and 
succeed in this environment, the scarcity of resources typical of a given 
ecological niche, strategies for insuring legitimacy and safety of offspring, 
the need to avoid, as much as possible, fatal outbreaks of violence that 
might consume the group, and so on. One way to insure the cohesion and 
friendliness of group members, for instance, is by sticking together. 
Endogamy – marrying within one’s group – is one way people stick together. 
Likewise, societies that are both patrilineal and patrilocal believe such 
arrangements achieve closeness among members of the society and at the 
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same time minimize hostility. Like the ancient Hebrews claiming descent 
from a common make ancestor like Abraham, all members of these 
patrilineal societies have a common male ancestor. These are only some of 
the ways that human groups thrive and survive by organizing themselves in 
ways that adapt to the conditions in which they find themselves. 
Now, what confounds students of HK is that it occurs within these very 
societies organized precisely along patrilocal, patrilineal and endogamous 
lines. Societies that seem consumed with the need to maintain security and 
predictability generate a social practice – HK -- of the most threatening and 
notionally destabilizing kind.  HK seems like a most non-adaptive practice. It 
diminishes a particular family by subtracting from the family and entire 
group a valuable female member of childbearing age. It further seems to 
offend the “one for all and all for one” ethos of these types of societies by 
preying upon one of their own  (206).
But, instead, Churchill claims it is precisely this essential element of common
blood achievement and debt that lays the bases for a crisis situation. The 
transgression of one against the norms of all is a transgression against all. A 
woman who transgresses against her marriage dishonors herself and the 
entire group. That is why her offense is so great, and why her punishment 
must be as great as well. And far from concluding that her elimination by HK 
be fatal to the group, Churchill’s “cultural evolutionist” approach claims 
instead that it enhances the survival chances of the group.  HK is ultimately 
adaptive, despite its subtraction of a fruitful member of the group, since it 
actually increases the esteem in which the HK family is held, and thus its 
value in the group at large. The HK increases the value of each remaining 
child of marriageable age, because the family will have demonstrated that its
honor will not permit any sort of breach – even if the victim of the HK has 
only been rumored to have been unfaithful (216f). 
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But many observers are confounded by the need to kill the supposedly 
wayward woman. Why so extreme a measure against what, after all, only 
may be a suspected transgression?  Why murder one of your own valuable 
females, often of child-bearing age, simply because the surrounding 
community might believe she has transgressed? The act of HK seems 
distinctly dysfunctional and the punishment of it, disproportionate. Many 
other kinds of penalties and punishments, short of death, are available. So, 
why choose killing? Why not return the wayward wife to her own family, or 
enslave, exile, physically punish, isolate, or publicly humiliate her  –complete
with a brazen scarlet letter “A”?  
Churchill answers again in terms further spelling out the brutal of the logic of
the honor/shame system.  If the wayward wife is not killed, she and her child 
will be “free riders” – thus dishonoring the legitimate family collectively as 
cuckolds  (218). The “natal family” – the wayward wife and her lover – must, 
therefore, not be seen as profiting from their ill-gotten – dishonorable – 
gains. In an endogamous patrilineal society, the male perpetrator could 
rightfully claim the power of paternity, all the while the legitimate family 
bore the costs of raising the child – the Cuckoo Effect. HK solves this crisis of 
family honor by effectively eliminating the woman, and in the process 
destroying the natal family. This insures that no dishonor should come to the
legitimate family. This is why, as Churchill says, HK is advertised as “honest 
signaling” (220). By contrast, the offending male is never killed, primarily 
because in an endogamous, patrilocal and patrilineal society that would 
incite something far worse -- internecine warfare – what Churchill calls 
“costly signaling” (211f).
10. Shedding the White Man’s Burden of Saving Brown Women from Brown
Men
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Churchill badly wants to end HK. But he’s thankfully not ham-strung by 
liberal guilt. Somehow, he developed immunity from charges of being just 
another “white man trying to save brown women from brown men,” as 
Gayatri Spivak memorably put it.(Spivak 2010) Nor is Churchill about to have
recourse in the pernicious ideologies that enabled occupation of the moral 
high-ground by imperious Westerners. Whether this came as theories of 
“white man’s burden,” the “mission civilsatrice,” Social Darwinist 
adaptability, Marxist liberation, Victorian humanist progressivism, or 
crusading Christian missionary soteriology, Western moral reformers came 
well-equipped to tell “them” how to behave. Churchill doesn’t do that. But 
readers also benefit from Churchill not predictably dissolving into a puddle of
liberal self-doubt. He badly wants to end HK.
Yes, we are all guilty of one sort of cultural transgression or another. But 
egregious as HK is, it seems to exceed the limits of tolerance afforded by 
social difference. Churchill’s no New England Congregational missionary 
prude demanding that Hawaiian women drape their naked bodies in an 
enveloping Mumu. At least that’s an attitude that Churchill silently assumes. 
Actually, it never crosses Churchill’s mind that some readers might tolerate 
HK. Nor does one suspect Churchill himself of trying deviously to pardon the 
practice of HK by attempts to comprehend it. Post-colonial literature 
sometimes defaults to actual defenses for one or another questionable 
Muslim practices, such as some gender division of labor, regimes of female 
modesty, wearing the hijab, and so on. But, even with the best of tolerant 
multicultural intentions, few of these interpreters of Islamic social practices 
will go so far as to justify, say, the all-enveloping burqa, or certainly, female 
genital mutilation.
Yet, some try – at least to rationalize the required wearing of the burqa. 
What I find interesting about particular efforts at tolerance is how absurd – 
even making allowances for cultural difference -- they turn out to be. 
Consider Muslim post-colonialist feminist, Lila Abu-Lughod’s reading of the 
21
burqa in Afghanistan. In her view, we should not judge the burqa out-of-hand
or  harshly as Western feminists have been wont to do. For Abu-Lughod, the 
burqa is part of the solution to female confinement, not part of the larger 
problem of Muslim gender segregation. Enveloped by her burqa, an Afghani 
woman, for example, can venture forth into the public, leave her home, shop
in the markets, run a business, even visit relatives and friends and so on. 
Safeguarded within her burqa, like some suburban soccer mom in her SUV 
high about the raging traffic, an Afghani woman can move about her 
dangerous world without fear of reproach or social penalty! (Abu-Lughod 
2002:785) Doubtless, what Abu-Lughod reports is true. But as intriguing as 
Abu-Lughod’s reading may be, one is tempted to press the issue. Yes, the 
burqa might well offer Afghani women some measure of control over their 
lives in public. But does one really imagine that Afghani women are content 
with this arrangement, especially as they learn ever more increasingly of the
normal lives of other – even Muslim – women in other places? It is hard to 
resist sarcasm by asking the question of what possible complaints be-burqa-
ed Afghani women could register since they can safely cruise about all be-
burqua-ed? If our suburban soccer moms don’t grumble about their SUVs, 
why should Afghani women whine about needing to don a full-bore burqa just
to step outside the house? 
Churchill does not approach the degree of tolerance of HK that Abu-Lughod 
affords the burqa. Nevertheless, he arms himself against charges of making 
excuses for HK because he argues from the relativizing perspective of social 
evolution. True, Churchill’s evolutionism relativizes a practice like HK by 
citing its functions for social survival within a particular ecological niche and 
level of historical development. Killing kin within a one’s own group is 
generally proscribed, but HK is an exception to the rule, because in saving a 
family’s honor, its functions to maintain a family’s survival. Killing other 
humans is likewise felt undesirable, but in societies where honor and shame 
frame behavior, killing to preserve honor maybe a necessity – however 
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unfortunate.  Churchill argues in somewhat the same way, namely that HK 
should be grasped as a necessary Darwinian “adaptation,” and hence as 
something necessary for survival of the social units practicing HK under 
certain conditions necessary for survival at certain times and places. HK, 
thus, “functions” for the survival of a social group only relative to specific 
historical stages of human cultural development and in particular cultural 
ecologies and material environments. Churchill’s detailed discussion of these
conditions dominate his discussion of the macro-causes of HK.
11. Immoral and Benighted
Despite the social functionality demonstrated for HK, not surprisingly, 
Churchill condemns HK, even if his moral disapproval tends to get lost in his 
intricate argumentation. But moral  condemnation is there, nonetheless. 
From an absolute standpoint, that is to say, outside the relative conditions of
its “archaic and dysfunctional” home location, Churchill declares HK plainly 
“immoral” (266). Quite simply, the existence of HK shows the extent to 
which “human beings are benighted” (168). 
While Churchill does not spell out the grounds for his moral judgment against
HK, he at least avoids defaulting to widely discredited ideological options. En 
route to the moral revolution that he hopes would put an end to HK, Churchill
speaks in a nebulous global moral language of undeclared provenance. In 
this, Churchill is in the excellent company of the estimable Kwame Anthony 
Appiah and his splendid treatise on the honor/shame social system, Honor 
Code.(Appiah 2010) There, Appiah derails potential backdoor neo-
imperialism by imagining moral revolutions generated from within a given 
culture, and not imposed upon it from outside. What Appiah (and Churchill) 
mean can be illustrated by the way 19th century Chinese elites ceased the 
honor-bound custom of binding the feet of their women. They did not do so 
because of moral condemnation by Western missionaries.  But when they 
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had embarked on a campaign of gaining respect for China abroad, they 
found that they were ashamed to admit foot-binding. Thus, for the sake of 
attaining new kinds and levels of honor, the Chinese abandoned older 
methods on their own terms. Churchill’s “bottom-up transformative 
processes” (282) are devised to do just that. 
Churchill is in good company with post-colonial, multicultural demands for 
indigenous moral and social reform like those advocated by anthropologist, 
Amina Jamal and philosopher, Kwame Anthony Appiah, respectively (Appiah 
2010; Jamal 2015). Recently, Jamal argued that moral revolutions ought to 
be justified from within a tradition or culture, not from without. Thus, in 
opposing such practices as HK, one ought not to imagine that transformative
change can only come from the defeat of ‘barbaric’ religions like Islam by the
imperial forces of enlightened secular Occidental universalism. Many Muslim 
leaders have in fact spoken out already against HK as being un-Islamic. Why 
might there not be other sources of opposition to HK, again, coming from 
within Islam, such as the Muslim feminists inspired by a “transgressive 
piety,” mentioned by Jamal? (Jamal 2015:59) Given that his program seeks to
relieve women of horrors of HK without invoking familiar tropes of imperialist
moralism, Churchill’s moral ambition seems to escape the suspicion of 
reflecting a narrow Western male gender bias. From the onset, he situates 
his quest for a moral revolution against HK in the contemporary consensus of
moral resistance to “gender violence” of any kind whatsoever – again, of 
undeclared provenance.
12. Critique: Development as Destiny and the Problem of “Moderate” Islam
In the end, does Churchill’s cultural materialism adequately address the 
questions one might have about HK? For instance, to Churchill, the rise and 
survival of HK seems to have little or nothing to do with contemporary 
human life like political ideology or religion. HK is best understood, he 
assumes, by attending to its development over a geologically lengthy period 
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of the evolution. With attention fixed on this long historical development, 
Churchill resists giving the contemporary religious politics of – especially -- 
modern Muslim theocratic nation-states, such as Iran, Pakistan, or Saudi 
Arabia much play in the HK of today. So, let me put some questions to 
Churchill that challenge his view.
a. How Do We Know?
Churchill says that HK is both “outdated” (264) and “archaic” (266). But 
Churchill’s longue durée evolutionary projections on the origins and nature of
HK will draw fire from critics who wonder how Churchill can be sure of the 
deep antiquity of HK. I put aside Churchill’s claim that HK is “outdated,” 
because saying something is, in effect, “out of fashion” seems more an 
understandable expression of disdain for HK. Fine. We all presumably share 
that view of the arc of human morality. But adding HK’s being “outdated” 
doesn’t tell us much more about Churchill’s thinking. At best, it is less a clear
statement of fact than one of Churchill’s evaluation  of HK. 
On the other hand, saying HK is “archaic,” and especially in the context of 
Churchill’s evolutionism, sounds like a straightforward historical claim. HK is 
an old  social practice, very old. But how do we really know that it is very old,
indeed, “archaic”? How, that is, do we know of HK’s existence before the 
relatively recent existence of human records, that Churchill himself cites? Ab
origine is a long while gone. I do not see how Churchill’s theory of cultural 
evolution is equipped to inform us about such remote pre-historic times. To 
root HK any deeper than historical times, as Churchill has tried to do, would 
seem to call for evolutionary theories with greater range than the one he’s 
supplied.
b. The Urgency of Now
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The extent to which one finds the archaic character of HKs questionable, one
naturally turns inquiry in the direction of the role of contemporary events 
and structures. But Churchill doesn’t do that. Although Churchill deals with 
the data of modern-day HK, as well as the psychological formation of the 
personality types likely to perpetrate HK, he shies away from linking these 
data to contemporary political situations that might have engendered them. 
Instead, what may seem as undue attention is to childrearing practices 
dominates his account of the psychological causes animating the HK 
perpetrators. Because he never considers the possible role of the agent 
structures of modern theocratic Muslim nation-states, Churchill does not 
venture to say why we should believe the modern political causes ought to 
be any less potent than child-rearing practices or the ancient cultural 
formations that he cites. But I shall do so here.  How, exactly, do we know 
that HK today is not better explained as a modern revived social practice? 
How do we know that modern structural demands, such as opposition to the 
West and its ethos of gender equality, are not responsible for HK? How does 
Churchill, instead, know that the way young boys are raised in societies 
practicing HK carries the greater weight of explanation he assigns it? How 
can one justify ignoring the festering contemporary religious politics of 
modern Muslim theocratic nation-states, such as Iran, Pakistan, or Saudi 
Arabia? About the effects of these explosive emotional forces within modern 
theocratic Muslim nation-states for the emergence and sustenance of HK, 
Churchill is mute.  This makes one wonder. 
Perhaps with so much invested in showing how HK makes functional sense in
HSCs, dysfunctional present-day causes, such as male anxieties about losing 
control, do not get the hearing they deserve? By relegating HK to a function 
within a specific bygone era, or to dwell on the sexual nurture of young boys 
in HSCs, Churchill also avoids the inconvenient way long-term dysfunctional 
social practices can persist in the short-term. One thinks of slavery in the 
mid-19th century antebellum American South as an instance of such a short-
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term success masking its long-term doomed extinction at the hands of 
emergent agricultural technologies. One might then entertain the notion that
HK was never quite as functional as Churchill makes out, never as relatively 
adaptive as he argues? Maybe HK is more an anthropological “survival,” 
clinging desperately to a narrow niche of viability, while the rest of the world 
moves on? 
c. You Call This Surviving?!
This is to argue that, considered as a presumed end-product of long cultural 
evolution, HK may be a good deal less adaptive, less functional for social 
survival than Churchill would have it. Stand back and look at the societies 
practicing HK, and that have presumably practiced HK for centuries. Even 
granting Churchill the proposition that HK could be an ingredient in attaining 
social stability, are not the societies practicing HK a pretty sorry lot? I accept 
that, as social experiments, cross-civilizational comparisons are treacherous 
and hard to control. But, choosing any measure of evaluating cultures, is 
Afghanistan more “successful” a society than Switzerland, or Saudi Arabia 
more so than Taiwan, Iran more than the PRC, Malaysia more than 
Singapore, or even Pakistan more than India? Would anyone be surprised if 
the comparatively different statuses of women, generally inscribed into the 
Islam of these nations, had anything to do with these differences? 
d. Nature Abhors the Warrior-Masculine Man
Similarly, on the male side of the HK phenomenon, recent work by Richard O.
Prum in the biology of culture suggests that evolution does not select for the 
kinds of cultures practicing HK.(Prum 2018:Ch 12) Unlike what evolution has 
conspicuously produced among our nearest biological relatives, the great 
apes, human evolution selects against the survival of the type of warrior-
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masculine, VPP (“violence-prone personality”) of the “Ardent Avenger” males
who perform HKs. Instead of selecting for the gender binarism typical of 
cultures practicing HK, human evolution seems, as well, to be selecting for 
the lessening of the biological, and thus cultural, differentiation of human 
males to females. Compared to the great gender disparity in physical size 
and strength of the great apes, the ratio of such differences between human 
males and females is far less. Unlike those cultures where the polarized 
male/female gender ideal persists (Muslim cultures, par excellence), human 
evolution shows a distinct preference for cultures where the roles of these 
lately-evolved, gentle men commonly overlap with those of women. 
Evolution is selecting for human gender relations where tasks such as work, 
nurturing, food acquisition and preparation, education and childrearing are 
shared between the sexes (Prum 2018:Ch 12). So, yes, HK may have been a 
factor in HK societies surviving, but the question Churchill needs to answer is
“surviving” in what broken – now “outdated” --condition, at what crippled 
state of development – cultural, spiritual, aesthetic, economic, political, 
social and so on? (216f). In terms, then, of these comparative circumstances 
of survival, Churchill’s arguments for HK’s fulfilling a function for survival 
might be regarded with a somewhat jaundiced eye. “Survival,” how and what
kind?
e. Islam in Question
Refocusing on the present naturally brings in religion, particularly the 
modern Islamic resurgence, so much the concern of Richard L. Benkin’s 
volume, What Is Moderate Islam?  Four specific questions come to mind in 
this connection. 
One. Churchill cites several Muslim authorities who tell us flat out that Islam 
could not have given rise to HK because Muslim authoritative texts and 
traditions denounce HK. The Quran nowhere sanctions HK, for example (30-
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1). But, does this argument suffice? It is unclear why we should grant any 
more validity to such a disassociation than we would to a Christian 
authority’s denying that the Crusades were “Christian” because they didn’t 
square with the Sermon on the Mount. Are these repudiations of the Islamic 
character of HK, then, perhaps only aspirational? Are they only statements of
hope that HKs would cease being so frequent in Muslim societies? Are they 
to be read any differently than similar denials of the actual history of the 
Christian character to the Crusades? We won’t really know until someone 
decides to research the question. 
Two. As I noted earlier, Churchill argues that HK is not unique to the Muslim 
world. “Being a member of the Muslim community is neither sufficient nor 
necessary condition for being implicated in honor killing, either as a 
perpetrator, accomplice or supporter (29). HK is not a “’Muslim problem’,” 
Churchill says (29). HKs also occur in Christian lands, such as Corsica, 
Greece, Sicily, Sardinia and Spain, as well as among the Druze, Hindus, Jews,
Sikhs and Yazidis (29). Yet, Churchill leaves this reader scratching his head, 
because he admits that “there is a general association, or overlay, between 
the density of enclaves in which HSCs exist and honor killings occur and 
global regions that are predominantly Muslim (31). HK thus occurs across a 
defined swath of the earth’s mid-section among “certain tribal peoples of the
deserts and dry mountain uplands” -- from Morocco along the length of 
Mediterranean North Africa up through Asia Minor and across the Middle East
to northern India (182). While this territory maps well onto the range of the 
Dar-al-Islam, excluding Indonesia, Churchill claims HK also occurs outside 
Muslim lands. Only the lack of good record-keeping prevents us from 
determining the density of the occurrence of HK in Muslim sub-Saharan 
Africa, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and the Balkans.  I would note, 
however, that all of the non-Muslim places that Churchill mentions where HK 
occurs -- Corsica, Greece, Sicily, Sardinia and Spain -- were, for extensive 
periods at one time Muslim domains.
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I think, however, that Churchill’s dismissal of a special relation between 
Islam and HK betrays some weaknesses. Churchill arbitrarily confines the 
influence of a “religion,” like Islam, to “religious observance or devotion.” At 
the same time, he refuses to assign – arbitrarily, it seems to me -- an Islamic 
description to other sorts of Muslim behavior. For instance, Churchill fixes on 
a Muslim’s supporting the Shari’a as somehow not equally definitive of 
Muslim piety as “religious observance or devotion” (29). Instead, he rules 
that this support of the Shari’a really only reflects “preferences for religious 
authoritarianism, strict observance of rules, and intolerance of both deviance
and ambiguity” -- as if, strangely, these were not also quintessentially 
Islamic values, albeit legal ones, rather than doctrinal or ritual. Here might 
be a good place to recall Asad’s analysis of Islam as a religion less defined by
accentuating beliefs than of fostering an umma to which the Muslim person 
can be said “to belong.” 
Finally, as if trying to correct himself in making this dubious distinction 
between Islam as belief and ritual practice over against Islam as “belonging” 
to the people of the Shari’a, Churchill immediately adds that “at most, one 
might infer an association between some forms of ultra-conservative Islam 
and such authoritarianism, strict observance of rules, and intolerance, on the
one hand, and support for honor killing, on the other” (29). But is this not to 
declare that at least this so-called “ultra-conservative” form of Islam might 
be a necessarily and/or sufficiently connected to the practice of HK? But, who
decides what kind of term, this “ultra-conservative” Islam is? Who decides 
what it means? Is it a tautology, as I argued Benkin’s “radical Islam” might 
arguably be?  Is “ultra-conservative” just “real” Islam, Islam with the gloves 
removed!? Does Islam itself tend, then, to be generally conservative – 
authoritarian, strict, and intolerant – to such an extent as to render “ultra-
conservative” tautologous? 
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And, if so, does this not replay all the conceptual difficulties plaguing 
Benkin’s What Is Moderate Islam? If that, additionally, is so, Churchill, like 
Benkin and company, will need frankly to address variations on the two 
questions that have haunted this review: Insofar as HK is a practice 
associated with “ultra-conservative” Islam, does that fact affect the 
likelihood of the term, “moderate Islam” remaining an oxymoron change” 
Similarly, does that same fact affect the likelihood of the term, “radical 
Islam” being a tautology, change as well? One might raise the same 
questions about “ultra-conservative” Islam and cliterodectomy, the 
segregation of the sexes, jihad, and a number of other practices for which 
“ultra-conservative” Islam seems to have an elective affinity. True, these 
practices are not exclusive to Muslim societies in general, but they are 
commonplace enough in the two increasingly influential monistic “ultra-
conservative” Muslim societies of Iran and Saudi Arabia to warrant 
respectfully posing some frank questions. If doing so can provoke Islam and 
the West to begin frank and candid attempts to understand each other, even
the many false steps taken by those wedded to the simplistic and question-
begging discourse of “moderate” and “radical” Islam will have made a solid 
contribution to the flourishing of the human species.
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